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IN TRE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
In the matter of the Estate of ANNA
L. HARRIS, Deceased,
ZION'S S_._-\_ \TINGS BANK & TRUST
COl\IP . .~NY, a Corporation,
Appellant,
vs.
STERLING P. HARRIS, Administrator of the Estate of Anna L.
Harris, Deceased,
Respondent.

No. 6238

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

The petition filed in the District Court (Abs. 2)
recites:
"That at the time of the death of Anna L.
Harris there was pending in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah a proceeding under Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act.''
Section 75 subsection (N) of the Bankruptcy Act
provides:
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"The filing of a petition or answer with the
clerk of the court or. leaving it with the conciliation commissioner for the purpose of sending the
same to the clerk of the court praying for relief
under this section shall immediately subject the
farmer and all his property 'vherever located for
all the purposes of this section to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the court.''
And further in proceedings under this section :
''The courts, the title, powers and duties of
its officers, etc. ****shall be the same as if a
voluntary petition for adjudication had been filed
or a decree of adjudication had been entered on
the day when the farmers petition asking to be
adjudged a bankrupt was filed with the clerk of
the court or left with the conciliation comnlissioner for the purpose of sending the same to the
clerk of the court.''
It will thus be seen that the jurisdiction and control
over the property existed in 'the federal court at the
time of death.
Subsection ( r) of Section 75 provides for the purposes of this section :
"****The term farmer includes not only an
individual who is primarily bona fide personally
engaged in producing products of the soil and
also **•X<*and includes the personal representative
of a deceased farmer.''
In so far as the jurisdiction of the United States
District Court existed prior to and at the time of the
death of Anna L. Harris, the statute last above quoted
has no application. The jurisdiction of a court over
property does not cease simply because of the death of
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the o'Yner. The proeeeding is so far in rem that it
continues. If that 'Yere not the rule great injustice might
be done because of proceedings existing in the court
before the death occurred.
Counsel exhibits great learning in directing attention to many federal cases which by no possible stretch
of the in1agination could have anything to do with this
appeal. We will therefore pass "\vithout notice his very
learned discussion.
General order fifty of the Supreme Court of the
United States prescribes the method by which a personal
representative initiates a proceeding, not the method by
which he continues a proceeding pending at the time
of the death of the debtor. The order of the District
Court based upon the application made, allowed either
the initiation of a new proceeding, or the continuation
of the proceeding pending at the time of the death of
the deceased. We consider it good practice to respect
the comity of courts, and even though no rule of law or
procedure required it, to present appropriate petitions
to courts which might be interested in the same property.
The fact that a petition was presented in this case which
was unnecessary in order to sustain the jurisdiction of
the federal court cannot be treated as an admission that
without it the federal court was lacking in jurisdiction
to continue the rehabilitation of the debtor's estate begun
in her lifetime.
The filing of the petition by Anna L. Harris subjected
her, ''and all of her property'' to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court. 'rhe jurisdiction was inpersonom and
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in rem. Death, of course, terminated jurisdiction over
the person but did not terminate jurisdiction over the
property. The federal court did hold that pending the
appearance of some representative having the right to
speak. General order 50-9 does not apply to this case.
Passing all of the discussions in appellant's brief
foreign to the questions before the court, we come to
page 19 and there find that counsel has seen fit to rest
the case upon two district court cases : In re: Buxton,
14 Fed. Sup. 617 and in re: Reynolds 21 Fed. Sup. 369.
The first from a district court in Illinois and the second
from a district court in Oklahoma. Both of these cases
have been disapproved by the Circuit Court of Appeals
of the Fifth Circuit in Hines v. Farkas 109 F. (2d) 289
decided January 22, 1940. The statutes of these states
are not essentially different from the statutes of Utah.
We consider it unnecessary to discuss or to quote from
this case. The reasoning appears to be sound and we
think the case should be followed.
Respectfully submitted,
J. D. SKEEN and
E. J. SKEEN,
Attor·neys for Respondent.
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6238

STERLING P. HARRIS, administrator of the estate of Anna L.
Harris, deceased,
Respondent.
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appeal from Third Judicial District Court,
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Honorable P. C. Evans, Judge
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In the

SUPREME COURT
of the

State of Utah
In the Matter of the Estate of
Anna L. Harris, Deceased.
ZION'S SAVINGS BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY, a corporation,
A ppellarnt,

\
\

I
Case No.

vs.

6238

STERLING P. HARRIS, administrator of the estate of Anna L.
Harris, deceased,

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
1.

GENERAL ORD'ER 50(9)

The administrator argues that no order of the probate court was necessary to authorize him to resort to
the bankruptcy court to apply for a revivor of the bankruptcy proceedings, claiming that he might have done
so without. This is indeed a surprising departure of
thought. Below he petitioned and his counsel argued

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
most strenuously for the order in question. They considered it necessary then. Their a.pplica tion is conclusive upon that proposition. And it is no less strange to
find the administrator and his counsel present on this
appeal resisting a reversal of an order which they now
characterize a.s unnecessary. If it is unnecessary, why
do they bother to sustain it~
As an alternative, the administrator argues that
General Order 50(9') applies only to administrators who
seek to initiate and not to revive a Frazier-Lemke proceedings (App. Br. 13). This is not so. It applies to both.
Assuming for argument that a state probate code
would permit a probate court to authorize its creature,
the administrator, to enter into bankruptcy, which we
have shown is not so in Utah, an administrator would
first have to be authorized by the. probate court to seek a
revivor in the bankruptcy court for he is only the creature, no more, of the probate court a.nd his powers would
not extend to shaking off at will the jurisdiction of his
creator and submitting the estate to some other court,
without that creator's consent. And certainly if the probate court forbade him, he could not enter into bankruptcy whether to institute or to revive a proceeding,
for not even a probate court is so powerless as to lack
full control over its own officer and creature, the administrator.
All this is upo:Q. considerations only of general la,v.
Respondent says General 0'rder 50(9') prescribes a method by which an administrator '' initia,tes'' a proceeding,
not that by w:hich he revives one (Resp. Br. 3). This is
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not so. The words "initiate," "institute" or "commence'' do not appear. The word used is "effect." The
language is only in regard to an administrator who desires to "effect" a composition or extension under Section 75. Now an administrator \vho seeks to revive is
endeavoring no less to ''effect'' an extension than one
who seeks to initiate a proceedings. The object is the
same-to ''effect" an extension under Section 75-in
both instances.
And in promulgating the Order the Supreme Court
only recognized the general law-a law of necessity and
order among courts-that the bankruptcy court should
be officially apprized by the probate court that the administrator (1) was in fact administrator and (2) had
obtained authority of his creator to go to the bankruptcy
court. These fundamental and indispensable facts the
Supreme Court says must appear by the certificate of
the probate court attached to the administrator's petition in the bankruptcy court.
We submit the implications of the Supreme Court
order are equally applicable in proceedings to initiate
or to revive and that the order of th·e probate court is
necessary in either instance both by general law and
Gene:··al Order 50(9) as well.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
II.

THE JURISDICTION OF THE BANKRUPTCY
COURT

Counsel make much of the fact that the administrator's intestate died while the bankruptcy proceedings
were pending in federal court and after the jurisdiction
of that court attached. The implication of their argument when followed to a conclusion is that the proceedings in the bankruptcy court actually suspended the state
laws of descent and distribution. For if regardless of
statutes of descent, an administrator can ~seize upon the
property of the heirs to whom it otherwise descends by
state law and by his own whim substitute the administration of a federal court (admittedly without probate
powers) for that of a probate court, and withhold it
from them three years under the Frazier-Lemke moratorium, statutes of descent are certainly suspended.
None of the heirs, not one of them, may want the bankruptcy proceedings instituted, or if already instituted,
maintained over the property. They all may prefer the
probate court upon whom the law enjoins that duty to
administer and distribute it. Bankruptcy, as it is to most
people, may be most distasteful to them. They may
desire and have ample means themselves to discharge
the de.ot upon the property and receive it at once at the
hands of the probate court-not three years hence. Yet
these heirs, the owners in law and to whom the property
descends by state law, cannot prevent a selfish administrator from resorting to bankruptcy and withholding·
the property-their own property-from them if he will.
This is exactly where respondent '-s argument will lead us.
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But the death of the intestate while the FrazierLemke proceedings pended should not complicate the
case. The state law of descent attached immediately
nevertheless. True, the federal court already had jurisdiction of the property. But this court is not trying the
question: What shall the federal court do now~ That
question is for that court to determine after this court
has said the order here was invalid and has set it aside.
At that time the federal court will be confronted with
what to do in a case in which the Almighty has deprived
it of a party and the state law and probate court have
refused to provide a new one for it. Quite likely the
federal court will be obliged to dismiss. It could hardly
do otherwise, being permanently without a party to the
cause. But that is not for this court. This court is trying
the questions of state law regarding statutory powers
of probate courts and administrators. The problem in
the federal court is one for that court later on.
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III.

THE WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY AND BETTER
RE.ASONE,D CASES ARE AGAINST T'HE
AD·MINISTRATOR

By our opening brief we showed that p·robate proceedings are purely statutory and that the probate court
and administr~,tor have only those power·s granted by
the Code. (App. Br. 14-15) in re: Cloward, 95 U. 453,
82 P. (2d) 336.
We also cited the only authorities then known to
us upon the power of the administrator and the probate
court to submit the real property to a bankruptcy court.
B oth held they could not because the real property was
vested in the heirs. (App. B.r. 19) in re: Buxton, 14 F.
Supp. 616. In re : Reynolds, 21 F. Supp. 369.
Thus we showed the administrator was powerles·s
upon two propositions: (1) Because the Probate Code
fails to empower him and (2) Because the real property
involved vested in and belonged to the heirs.
The administrator has not attempted to answer the
first proposition. He does! not even discuss it. And
obviously he cannot, for such a proposition as that probate courts and. their administrators have only thos·e
powers· conferred by statute is altogether unanswerable.
This. court ·.has so held. In re : Cloward SUpra. So in
failing to atterp.pt an answer, the administrator. must be
held to have conceded this proposition. In fact, in face
of the Cloward case, he eannot dispute it. And in face of
this concession all other propositions become unimportant, for to admit the court and its administrator have
no power under the Code to enter into bankruptcy, leave~s
1

1
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the order to fall of its o''~ weight and it beeon1es vain
for the administrator to argue any other propositions.
But he does so neYertheles1s. Hurdling the first and
certainly the all important question he arrives at the
second. It is: Can the administrator submit the real
property to the bankruptcy court when it is not even; his
to do with but belongs to the heirs under the statutes of
descent! He cites Hines vs. Farkas, 109 F. (2,d) 289·.
The case was from Georgia. Apparently the statutes
were similar to ours. The two decisions referred to by
us, holding the administrator is powerless over the real
property for bankruptcy purposes were cited. The
answer of the court was, ''We do not agree,'' hardly
more. Significantly, the lower court had followed the
Buxton and Reynolds cases, their logic being reasonable
to the mind of that judge, he, too, being of opinion the
administrator was without power to take the heirs'
property to a bankruptcy court. The case is binding
only in the Fifth Circuit. It is not binding upon this
court. This court is free to follow the weight of authority
and the better reasoned cases ~nd to interpret the Probate Code of Utah for itself. Compare the ·full, l~gical
reasoning and well-considered opinions in the Buxton
and Reynolds cases with the scant discussion in the Hines
case. Consider when by the laws of descent property
vests in heirs whether someone else, the administrator,
may deprive them of it regardless of state laws of
descent and state rules of property which are supTeme
and we submit the answer, immediately apparent, is that
the admini~strator may not.
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The reasoning of the two cases relied upon by appellant is the better and they are· the weight of authority.
The administrator may not submit the heirs' property
to the bankruptcy court.
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I'F. THE ADMINISTRATOR DOES NOT DENY THE
INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PETITION OR THE
COURT'S ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
By our opening brief we showed the petition failed
to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
If for no other reason, the order thereon is e~rroneous.
We refer the reader to our opening brief for this discussion. (App. B:r. 24).
We also showed that the court had a duty to appraise
the situation and was obliged to exHrcise: a sound discretion in deciding the petition of administrator who
already for one year in the probate court, and whose
intestate for another year before him in the bankruptcy
court, had journeyed without avail and who failed to
appear here until five days before sheriff's deed, and
still failed, even by way of allegation, to offer any. solution. And we demonstrated that upon appraising this
situation and in considering the time already wasted,
the total and unexplained inaction of the administrator,
and finally the utter lack of any suggestion of hope calculated to extricate the estate, the heirs and the mortgagee from this predicament a sound discretion should
have been indulged and should have led the court to deny
the petition, failing which the court's action constituted
a thorough abuse of discretion in the circumstances.
Respondent's brief deals with neither of these propositions, the sufficiency of the petition or the, abuse of
the court's discretion. He denies neither. Failing to
controvert them he must concede their correctness. By
similar quiescence he has conceded, as we have seen, a
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third proposition entirely devastating to his cause, viz.,
That probate courts and administrators have only those
powers conferred by the Code and the latter nowhere
confers the power sought he~re. Thus failing to controvert them the administrator admits three propositions
we contended for: (1) That he and the probate court
are under the Code be·reft of the powers claimed, (2) the
petition lacks facts to state a cause of action, and (3)
the court abused its discretion in granting the petition.
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v.... THE POWERS OF THE PROB.ATE COURrr AND
ITS AD,~IINISTRATOR ARE QUESTIONS OF
STATE LA\V. THE STAT:E COURT'S D·ETERMINATION HEREIN WILL BE FINAL AND BIND;S
THE BANKRUPTCY COURT.
This court need entertain no doubt upon the efficacy
of its decision to be rendHred here.
Questions of state law, statutory and otherwise, are
exclusively for state courts. Their interpretation is binding on all others.
Time was until just recently (1938) when federal
courts were bound as to state law only by positive· state
statutes on a subject but were otherwise free to apply
their own reasoning to matters of general or unwritten
state law even though the result might be exactly opposite to the settled decisions of the highest state court
upon the subject. This was by rule of the early United
States Supre!Ille Court decision in 1842 in the famous
case, Swift vs. Ty~son, 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. Ed. 865. And for
nearly 100 years this rule obtained. But in too many
instances the decisions of the state and federal courts
were at war upon substantive questions of unwritten
state law. Abuses became the rule rather than the exception. For example, it was even possible for a nonresident plaintiff to take his case to the highest state
court and if defeated take a voluntary nonsuit and then
renew the controversy in the fede,ral court. See Erie
R. Co. vs. Tompkins (note 9) infra. The injustice and
confusion resulting from Swift vs. Tyson provoked eontinning agitation against its rule throughout the 96 years
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of it~s force by many of our country's outstanding lawyers,
among them Mr. Frankfurter. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Powers Betwe.en Federal and Stafe
Courts ( 19'28) 13 Cornell L. Q. 499'. See Erie R. Co. v-s.
Tompkins (note 6) infra.
The ag~tation against the injustice and confusion
resulting from Swift vs·. Tyson did not attain fruition
until two years ago (1938) when the Supreme Court
finally and expressly overruled that case and adopted
the more sensible and ju!st rule· that questions of state
law unwritten as well as written are exclusively for
state courts and the fede.ral courts are bound by and
must follow their interpretation. Erie R. Co. vs. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817. It was said by way of
introduction:
''The question for decision is whether the oftchallenged doctrine of Swift v. Tyson shall now
be disapproved. ''
And after an historical discussion of Swift vs. Tyson
the confusion and injustice incident to its doctrine and
the necessity for its overruling, the court squarely overruled it and said:
''Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law
to be applied in any case is the law of the state.
And whether the law of the state shall be declared
by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest
court in a decision is not a matter of ff?deral
conc-ern.'' (Italics added)
The effect of this· new and just doctrine binding federal courts to state- court interpretation of state law rus
applied to bankruptcy is now revealed in the very recent
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case (March 25, 1940) which followed the Tompkins case,
viz., Thompson Ys. Magnolia Petroleum Company. 60
S. Ct. 628. (Adv. Sheet No. 11, April 15, 1940). Two
federal Circuit Courts of Appeal had reached opposite
conclusions upon the effect of old right of way deeds to
railroad companie·s of Illinois lands· overlying a rich oil
field discoYered in 1938. Whether these documents conveyed
a fee with the consequent right to drill for and
.
capture the underlying· oil or simply an easement for
road-bed purposes \Yas the question. No applicable state
cottrt decision upon the subject had ever been rendered.
Should the federal court let the railroad's trustee in
bankruptcy be heard in the bankruptcy court about a
matter of state law as yet wholly undetennined by the
highest court of lllinois and be put to the risk of gue·ssing
in advance what the state court might later hold to be
the law~ Or should the trustee in bankruptcy be remitted
to an action as plaintiff in the state court where the
question would be authorita~ively and conclusively decided~ The answer was obvious. At least to the United
States Supreme Court it was obvious. It :said:
"Decision with which the federal court of
bankruptcy is here faced calls for interpretation
of instruments of conveyance in accordance with
Illinois law. Neither statutes nor decisions of
Illinois have been nointed to which are clearly
applicable. And the difficulties of determining
just what should be the decision under the law
of that State are persuasively indicated by the
different results reached by the two Circuit
Courts of Appeal that have attempted the determination. Unless the matter is referred to the
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State courts, upon subsequent decision by the
Supreme Court of Illinois it may appear that
, rights in local property of parties to this proceeding have-by the accident of federal jurisdiction-been determined contrary to the law of the
State which in such matters is supreme.'' (Italics
added) Thompson vs. Magnolia Petroleum Company supra.
And so the Supreme Court ordered the trustee in
bankruptcy to prosecute the case in the state court of
Illinois. The reason being that the law of the state as
interpreted by the state court would be supreme. The
doctrine of Erie R. Co. vs. Tompkins supra is thus logically projeeted into bankruptcy matters. Thus federal
courts in bankruptcy are bound by the state law as
interpreted by the state courts no less than they are in
civil cases. The federal court of bankruptcy in the matter
of this administrator's attempt to revive the FrazierLemke proceedings in question will be bound by this
court's decision here. When this court decides, as we
confidently assert it will and must under our state probate statutes, that an administrator is powerless and a
p:r:obate court is bereft of authority to empower him to
enter into or revive a bankruptcy, the question will be
authoritatively concluded once and for all by the highe:st
court of the land empowered to deal with it. The federal
court of Utah and all others will then be bound. None
may dispute it.
And so we say again this court need entertain no
doubt upon the efficacy of its decision to be rendered
here.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

Again, as in our opening brief, we say whether an
administrator who is a statutory creature should be empowered to resort to bankruptcy is a question exclusively
for the state legislature. It has not yet ordained that
he may. If it be intended that he shall, that body must
:first say so. The courts may not introduce the abs.ent
power into the statute.
Moreover, the realty having devolved upon the heirs,
the administrator's limited powers by the weight of
authority and the better reasoned cases do not admit of
his subjecting it to a bankruptcy court.
Furthermore, the petition lacks facts to state a caus.e
of action and the court abused its dis.cretion in granting
the order and the same must he reversed with costs .

. THOMAS & THOMAS,
Attorneys for Ap~pellant
Dated May 20, 1940.
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